THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN FACTS AND VALUES REFUTED
By Christopher Eddy
Part
One
The
distinction between statements of fact and judgments of value has
been central to moral philosophy for the last 250 years, ever since
it was first formulated by David Hume. The distinction is between
“factual” or “descriptive” statements, i.e., statements which
make claims about what is
the case (e.g., about what a person actually did) and “evaluative”,
“prescriptive” or “normative” statements, i.e., statements
about what ought
to be the case (e.g., about what he ought or ought not to have done).
Hume
claims that prescriptive conclusions can never validly be inferred
from merely descriptive premises alone, which is probably true. For
example, it may be a fact that everyone does tell lies from time to
time, but from this descriptive premise we cannot validly infer the
prescriptive conclusion that everyone ought to tell lies from time to
time.
But
Hume also implicitly claims that the distinction between descriptive
and prescriptive statements is absolute, so that there is no kind of
descriptive statement that could ever have the force of a
prescription, and no kind of value-judgment that could ever have the
status of a fact. This doctrine has had enormous importance in
moral philosophy because it has been taken as implying that moral
judgments can have no value in terms of truth, but must be regarded
ultimately as expressions of subjective will rather than descriptions
of objective reality.
Hume’s
claim seems convincing as long as we consider only the explicit
logical content of statements and ignore the relations of authority
and responsibility they implicitly invoke between interlocutors in
real exchanges, - relations recognized through recent developments in
the philosophy of language involving the commitments assumed and
entitlements claimed and conferred when one speaker makes a
statement, whether descriptive or prescriptive, in the presence of
others. In this connection I would mention particularly the work of
Robert Brandom, which I think provides a basis for refuting the claim
that the distinction between descriptive and evaluative statements is
absolute, as follows.
If I say
to you that “Everyone tells lies from time to time”, my doing so
is an exercise of authority. I exert my authority as a speaker in
calling on you to agree to that statement or at least not contradict
it, and in doing so I implicitly make myself responsible, if you
challenge me, for justifying that statement to you, i.e., giving
reasons why you ought to agree to it or at least not contradict it.
We both
take it for granted that, when I make a statement, I am exerting
authority and assuming responsibility in relation to you: it is the
basic understanding that all speakers have of what is implicit in
relations between them. This is the grammar of interlocutory
relations which we employ intuitively, as an essential part of our
linguistic competence, just as we intuitively employ our grammatical
sense of the difference between questions, statements and commands.
Thus we
can see that the descriptive statement, “Everyone tells lies from
time to time”, is not properly recognizable as the meaningful
utterance of one speaker to another unless it is understood as
implicitly establishing a range of commitments and entitlements
between the interlocutors. In saying that everyone tells lies, I
implicitly commit myself to justifying that statement if asked to do
so, i.e., to giving you reasons for agreeing with it, so that, if I
cannot supply a meaningful reason when asked, I am implicitly
committed to withdrawing the statement, and, if I then refuse to
withdraw it, I stand in breach of my implicit commitments as a
speaker. The fact that I uttered the statement implicates me
necessarily in commitments and entitlements from which certain
conclusions follow which are unmistakably evaluative, prescriptive or
normative. In other words, Hume’s distinction is not absolute:
there are normative facts.
This
analysis may seem trivial when applied to descriptive statements, but
it has very powerful implications when applied to prescriptions. If
I propose a course of action, I implicitly ask for your consent to
it, which means that there are certain types of action which I could
not propose to you without implicit self-contradiction, namely, those
which could occur, by definition, only without your consent, e.g.,
that you be “raped, enslaved, tortured or murdered”; and this
entails that these are types of action which can never meaningfully
be justified, because there could never be a reason for your
consenting to a proposal which could be acted on only without your
consent. I call this the Consent Principle.
It is a
logical fact that acts of rape, enslavement, torture and murder are,
in this sense, absolutely unjustifiable, but “unjustifiable” is
an evaluative, prescriptive or normative term, so it is clear that
there are evaluative, prescriptive or normative statements which are
also statements of descriptive fact, but ones from which prescriptive
conclusions can validly be drawn, and therefore that the absolute
distinction between facts and values stands refuted.
Part
Two
Various kinds of
objection have been advanced to counter the Consent Principle, as
follows:
First Objection: The
use of punishment, - i.e., the compulsory enforcement of legal
penalties for breaches of the law, - is necessary for the maintenance
of social order and is therefore justifiable in every sense that
matters, but, if that is so, then it cannot be the case that the
contradiction involved in consenting to be penalized without one’s
consent would render punishment absolutely unjustifiable.
This objection fails
because the use of punishment is not necessary to the preservation of
social order. A person convicted of an offence could be asked
whether he consented to the penalty provided for it by law: it would
then be open to him either to consent to it and freely accept it as a
voluntary penance or to refuse it. If he didn’t consent, - like a
player in a game who refused a penalty awarded against him and left
the field of play, - he would be placing himself in an attitude of
hostility to the law, which would then entitle society to act in
self-defence by interning him, as if he were a prisoner of war, until
the cessation of hostilities, i.e., until either his conviction or
sentence was quashed on appeal or his refusal was withdrawn.
This procedure presents
no practical problems and would have more than one advantage. It
would enable the state to acknowledge three important kinds of
possibility without prejudging them: that the conviction might be
false, even though the appeals procedure had been exhausted; that the
constitutional order defended by the law might be unjust, e.g., by
excluding women or some other group from the franchise; or that the
law might be driven by the irrational prejudices of a majority, as
with laws against gay sex. Also, if the convict is given the option
to accept or reject his sentence, then, if he accepts it, he takes
the first step, - however reluctantly, - towards reconciliation with
society.
Finally, the American
Declaration of Independence asserts that the authority of government,
which necessarily includes the right to impose legal penalties,
derives only from “the consent of the governed”, and the
arrangement I have proposed enables the state to make that principle
explicit every time a convict is sentenced and thereby to acknowledge
that punishment, - penalizing without consent, - is an exercise not
of responsible authority, but only of arbitrary power.
Of course it is true
that being “interned” under Geneva Convention conditions is very
similar to being “imprisoned”, but it is very different from
being compelled to suffer death, mutilation, physical pain or the
mental torments of humiliation or solitary confinement, and having it
as an option completely destroys the claim that punishment is
necessary to the preservation of social order on which this objection
depends.
Second Objection:
Soldiers defending their country against invasion are justified in
killing enemy soldiers intentionally, even though those enemy
soldiers do not consent to be killed, and if it is justifiable to
kill people intentionally without their consent in defensive
war-fighting, then it may be justifiable in a defensive campaign
against crime to kill intentionally and without their consent people
convicted of murder; so consent cannot be the basis of a rigid
distinction between what is and what is not justifiable.
This challenge can
succeed only if we ignore the glaringly obvious difference between
the intentions of a soldier on the battlefield in a defensive war and
those of the executioner when he carries out the sentence of death on
a convict, - intentions which are made explicit in the orders on
which each is authorized to act. The soldier is ordered to
“advance” or “retreat”, to “take”, “hold” or
“bombard” particular positions, and he is trained to use his
weapons in defence of himself and his comrades when acting on those
orders, but he is never ordered specifically to “injure” or to
“kill” anyone. It may be that his actions will result in death
or injury to enemy soldiers, but, on condition that he is acting on
legal orders in a genuinely defensive campaign, he cannot be said to
intend those deaths and injuries, and he cannot therefore be asked to
justify proposing to cause them.
As conclusive proof
that defensive military action is not intended to cause death, we may
observe that, when an army has prevailed on the battlefield in a
defensive action, the medics will be sent in to save as many lives as
possible on both sides; indeed, it is conceivable that a defensive
military action might be successful without anyone on either side
being actually killed or injured, e.g., if one side surrendered or
ran away.
In vivid contrast, the
executioner receives an explicit order from the court to kill a
specified individual at a specified time on a specified day. When
the executioner sets out to comply with that order, the convict
presents no threat to him against which he could claim to be acting
in self-defence, because the convict is bound hand and foot and
helpless in his power, - as is also true of the relation between a
torturer and his victim. Furthermore, if the executioner fails in
his first attempt to kill the convict, - for example, by
electrocution, - he is required to administer repeated charges of
electricity until the convict is dead. If a soldier treated a
prisoner of war the way the executioner treats the convict, he would
be guilty of a war-crime and would stand in danger of a
court-martial.
It follows that the way
deaths are caused in defensive war-fighting provides no moral
precedent or parallel justification for the use of capital
punishment, and this is so perfectly clear that anyone who maintains
the contrary must be suspected of willful self-deception.
Third Objection: There
are certain circumstances in which our consent, once given, cannot
subsequently be retracted, so that, even if we subsequently declared
that we withdrew our consent, the subsequent declaration would have
no meaning, - no logical force, - because we would remain logically
bound by our initial consent. Any subsequent attempt to retract
would be merely apparent and therefore could not in reality
contradict the initial consent, so that no contradiction would be
involved in consenting initially to be disposed of subsequently,
e.g., punished, without our consent; and the circumstances in which
this applies occur when our consent is given contractually, i.e.,
when each party gives his consent irrevocably on condition that every
other party also gives his consent in a similarly irrevocable manner.
This objection must
fail because it entails the contradiction that we could responsibly
renounce in advance the responsibility to choose thereafter,
abolishing our status as responsible agents by turning ourselves into
automata logically programmed by contract. This idea is so
obviously absurd that those who have espoused it must ask themselves
what kind of motive could have been strong enough to lead them into
such an egregious error.
Fourth Objection:
Actions of rape, enslavement, torture or murder could be justified as
the “lesser of two evils” if refraining from them would risk
consequences which were disproportionately bad, e.g., in terms of the
numbers of individuals harmed, but, if this is so, then consent
cannot be the basis of a rigid distinction between what is
justifiable and what is not.
This challenge merely
states the well-known “consequentialist” position, and its
credibility derives from the fact that it is common sense to evaluate
actions in terms of their foreseeable consequences: if one action is
likely to cause less harm than the alternatives, common sense says
that we ought to choose it. It is common sense to reason
consequentially, but the central point at issue is whether there is a
logical limit to the application of consequential reasoning, and, on
the theory for which I am arguing, there is just such a logical limit
in the facts of interlocutory grammar, the rules which all speakers
intuitively recognize as implicitly governing the relations between
them.
It is a fact of
interlocutory grammar that whoever proposes a course of action
implicitly solicits consent to it and therefore implicitly makes the
factual claim that it is the kind of proposal to which everyone could
without self-contradiction give their consent. Because this is a
claim about logical facts, - i.e., about whether consenting to it
would be self-contradictory or not, - it is open to conclusive
refutation by demonstrative argument, and, if it is refuted, the
proposer is thereby implicitly committed to withdrawing the proposal.
This sets a limit to what can meaningfully be proposed and
therefore to the kinds of proposal that can meaningfully be
justified.
Fifth Objection: The
so-called facts of interlocutory grammar are open to question. It
is reasonable to believe that proposals are addressed not to
everyone, but only to those for whom consenting would not entail a
contradiction: to what we might call “coalitions of the willing”.
There is then no contradiction entailed in some consenting to
punish others without having to seek their consent.
If this were so, then
any group which had the power to do so in a particular situation
might be justified in subjecting to its collective will any
other group from which it was distinguished in terms of sex, class,
race, language, religion or legal status without recognizing any
requirement to seek the consent of the members of the subjected
group; but this perspective, which would make genocide justifiable,
is in violent conflict with the universally recognized demands of
justice, which require that what is done to any person be justifiable
to that person, and “justice” is simply another word for
the implicit rules of interlocutory grammar.
Sixth Objection:
Taxation is necessary to the functioning of a complex society, so
taxation must be justifiable; but some people pay their taxes not by
consent, but only under compulsion: they deny that the state is
justified in confiscating their property by taxation. So, if
taxation is justifiable, justifiability cannot be subject to the
Consent Principle.
This objection fails
because, as David Hume also pointed out, property is not a natural
fact, but a legal convention with rules which specify the conditions
under which an individual may claim property in goods of any kind,
whether it be land, livestock or money; and the laws under which
people are taxed are a part of those rules, so that, to claim
“property” in anything is to invoke the rules which determine
what shall be regarded as the claimant’s property, and these
include the tax laws. To repudiate the tax laws is to repudiate the
conventions of property as such and thereby forfeit any basis for
claiming that what the taxman demands of you is “yours”. We
consent to be taxed by consenting to the conventions of property
ownership, so taxation is always by consent.
Seventh Objection:
Under the Consent Principle, a proposal would be absolutely
unjustifiable only if there were at least one speaker who could not
meaningfully consent to it, but this means that some kinds of
proposal which most people would regard as absolutely unjustifiable,
for example, torturing non-linguistic animals or pre-linguistic
infants, could be justified to all speakers, because there would be
no speaker for whom consenting to it involved a contradiction, and
such actions would therefore have to be permitted This suggests
that what most people mean by “justifiable” has no necessary
relation to consent.
The objection is
correct that the proposal to torture non-linguistic animals or
pre-linguistic infants is not absolutely unjustifiable, but this does
not mean that it must therefore be permitted by law. For example,
no contradiction is involved in proposing that someone be assisted to
commit suicide, but it does not follow necessarily from this that the
act of assisting suicide ought to be permitted by law, because,
although there are reasons for permitting it, there are other reasons
which would justify prohibiting it, as there are for prohibiting
cruelty to animals: in matters like this, consequential arguments
must be allowed to decide the issue.
Conversely, the fact
that proposing to “insult” someone would be absolutely
unjustifiable (since nobody could meaningfully consent to be
insulted) does not mean that insulting people ought absolutely to be
prohibited by law: of course there are situations in which a certain
(e.g., racial) type of insult could have socially disruptive
consequences, and the law might be used to prevent that, because that
is the law’s raison d’etre. The law’s purpose is to
minimize harm, not to make people virtuous; but even in minimizing
harm, the law is subject to the limits of the Consent Principle.
Eighth Objection: To
propose a law which prohibits a type of act, like assisting a
suicide, which is not absolutely unjustifiable under the Consent
Principle, and which many people do passionately advocate, is to ask
those advocates to consent to what they do not consent to, i.e., a
law which prohibits what they advocate, and doing that seems to
violate the Consent Principle; but, if that is the case, and
proposing such a law is justifiable, then the Consent Principle must
be rejected. Indeed, the very idea of a legal system raises the
possibility that individuals will be subject to constraints to which
they do not consent, so that law as such becomes unjustifiable.
This objection fails
because to prohibit a type of act is not to do anything which anyone
is logically unable to consent to. Even if I advocated a law
which permitted assisted suicide, there would be nothing
self-contradictory in my consenting to obey one which prohibited it;
because, as David Hume pointed out, none of the reasons I could offer
in favour of doing that or any other type of action could ever
irresistibly compel me to do it and thereby force me to endure
without my consent the consequences of violating a legal prohibition;
besides, consenting to obey a law which prohibits a particular act
does not entail consenting to be punished if convicted of breaking
it.
The idea that systems
of law as such could be unjustifiable makes no sense: to propose a
legal system is to ask others to agree with you on a set of laws, but
to propose that there be no legal system is to ask others to agree
that there be no agreement, which is absurd.
This concludes my
defence of the Consent Principle and my refutation of the distinction
between facts and values.
__________
Copyright ©
Christopher Eddy 2011
(3237 words, including
title)
In my paper, A
Theory of Moral Intuition, I make the claim, "THAT HUMAN
SPEAKERS CAN GRASP MORAL QUALITIES, I.E., GOOD AND EVIL,
INTUITIVELY.” The argument may be summarized as follows:
1.0. INTUITION.
1.1. A quality is
grasped "intuitively", by definition, when the quality is
self-evident and the grasp is direct (but not necessarily
infallible).
1.2. For a quality to
be "self-evident" it is necessary that, like sensory
qualities such as colour or taste, it not be determined by the
preferences of the individual subject.
1.3. A quality is
grasped "directly" (but not infallibly) when, as in seeing
or tasting, the grasping is not mediated by a reasoning process.
2.0. INTENTIONS &
PROPOSALS.
2.1. "Moral"
qualities are qualities of actions, by definition.
2.2. Actions are, by
definition, events characterized by intentions, both positive and
negative.
2.3. The intention that
characterizes an action can be explicitly stated, before or after the
event, in the form of a proposal.
2.4. To justify an
action, before or after the event, reasons must be given why others
should consent to that proposal.
2.5. So moral qualities
are qualities of the intentions-expressible-as-proposals whereby
events are recognized as actions.
3.0. RECOGNIZING
CONTRADICTIONS.
3.1. If a proposal is
self-contradictory, its being so is not determined by the preferences
of the individual subject: self-contradictoriness is in this sense
self-evident.
3.2. Reasoned argument
can be used to show that a proposal is self-contradictory, but the
absurdity of proposing a contradiction is not demonstrable by
argument: it can only be recognized directly.
3.3 If the
self-contradictoriness of a proposal is recognized, it can be only by
that kind of intuition which is involved in the recognition of
linguistic meaning.
4.0. MORAL
QUALITIES.
4.1. The meanings of
the words "good" and "evil" derive from their
role in the linguistic practices of proposing and justifying.
4.2. A type of action
which absolutely cannot be recommended as "good" is evil,
by definition.
4.3. "Good"
and "Evil" are words used to distinguish moral qualities,
i.e., the qualities of self-evidently distinct and mutually exclusive
types of intention.
5.0. CONSENT &
IMPLICIT SELF-CONTRADICTION.
5.1. It is self-evident
that the act of proposing a particular course or general rule of
action expresses the agent's intention to obtain for it the consent
of other speakers.
5.2. There are types of
action, such as rape, which can occur, by definition, only in the
absence of the consent of the person on whom they are inflicted.
5.3. Proposing actions
of that type, i.e., seeking consent to what can occur only without
it, is implicitly self-contradictory and therefore absurd: this is
“the Consent Principle”.
5.4. A type of action
which cannot be proposed without absurdity cannot without absurdity
be justified.
6.0. CONCLUSION
6.1. The self-evident
difference between actions which can and actions which cannot be
proposed and justified without implicit self-contradiction can be
grasped directly, and therefore intuitively, though not infallibly,
by all human speakers through the exercise of that faculty which
makes them able to understand speech.
6.2. That difference is
between actions which can without absurdity be called "good"
and those which cannot, and which can therefore only be called
"evil".
6.3. THEREFORE: Human
speakers can grasp moral qualities, i.e., good and evil, intuitively.